

Rancièreat Aesthetic Education: Another Scene of Art Education

Jaakko Jekunen

Rancièrian Aesthetic Education: Another Scene of Art Education

Jaakko Jekunen

Master of Arts thesis

30 ECTS

Master's Program in Art Education

Department of Art

Aalto University School of Arts, Design and Architecture

Supervisor: Juuso Tervo

2016

Author Jaakko Jekunen		
Title of thesis Rancièrian Aesthetic Education: Another Scene of Art Education		
Department Department of Art		
Degree programme Master's Program in Art Education		
Year 2016	Number of pages 54	Language English

Abstract

This Master's thesis is a theoretical intervention. It aims to rethink key concepts of art and its education. Especially, to interrogate the connections between emancipation, education, aesthetics and politics. Its conceptual practice means its approach is philosophical. All of this comes together in the research question: what could Rancièrian aesthetic education be?

In this thesis, I begin by examining Jacques Rancièrè's (a French philosopher) writings on method. His opposition to a hierarchical theoretical practice is exemplified by an adherence to egalitarian method and the use of topographical analysis, refusing to uncover hidden truths. Taking these methodological thoughts seriously, I don't provide a conclusive and exegetical reading of Rancièrè's work, but a proposal of what Rancièrian aesthetic education *could* be.

In chapters 2–5, I engage with different aspects of Rancièrè's philosophical project. First, I uncover the way Rancièrè has rethought the concept of emancipation as equality verifying action. Then, I move on to explore what he has written about the process of politics as something fundamentally polemical. Rancièrè's concept of the distribution of the sensible shows the aesthetic nature of human communities and the process of politics. Exploration of these connections open up chapter 5, which moves to treat Rancièrè's art theoretical writings.

I don't want to raise Rancièrè to a position of mastery as *the* philosopher that prescribes what to do in e.g. education or politics. This is why I stage an encounter between Rancièrian theorization and the proposals of art education theorist Jan Jagodzinski in chapter 6. Through this, I interrogate the limits of Rancièrè's positions and gain an understanding to what remains undertheorized or lacking in his work.

I begin chapter 7 by mapping out prior art education research that comes close to my thesis. I focus on Anglo-American art education discourse. After this, I expose my proposal. Rancièrian aesthetic education has to acknowledge the fundamentally antagonistic nature of human communities. The aesthetic, conceptualized as the sensible fabric of human being-together, has only a limited connection to politics. It can directly alter the distribution of the sensible through works of art or open up possibilities of dissensus. The aesthetic cannot substitute politics. This creates other restrictions for Rancièrian aesthetic education as it needs to remain antiteleological.

The main limitations of my proposal are its imperative of action, undertheorized dimension of temporality and the lack of freedom from its conceptual repertoire. Most pressing problem for my proposal of Rancièrian aesthetic education is to find ways to apply it, put it to action.

This thesis shows how Rancièrian theorization can be used in thinking about art and its education. It provides a useful theoretical framework for exploring the connections between education, art and politics.

Keywords Jacques Rancièrè, aesthetic education, educational philosophy, emancipation, politics, aesthetic, Rancièrian aesthetic education

Tekijä Jaakko Jekunen

Työn nimi Rancièreaan Aesthetic Education: Another Scene of Art Education

Laitos Taiteen laitos

Koulutusohjelma Kuvataidekasvatuksen koulutusohjelma

Vuosi 2016

Sivumäärä 54

Kieli Englanti

Tiivistelmä

Tämä maisterin opinnäytetyö on teoreettinen interventio. Se tähtää ajattelemaan uudelleen taiteen ja taidekasvatuksen avainkäsitteitä. Se tutkii erityisesti emansipaation, kasvatuksen, esteettisen ja politiikan suhteita. Sen käsitteellinen työskentely tarkoittaa, että se on lähestymistavaltaan filosofinen. Kaikki tämä yhdistyy tutkimuskysymyksessäni: mitä Rancièrelainen esteettinen kasvatustavoitus voisi olla?

Aloitin opinnäytetyön tarkastelemalla Jacques Rancièren, ranskalaisen filosofin, kirjoituksia metodista. Hänen vastustuksensa hierarkkista teoreettista työskentelyä kohtaan näyttää sitoutumisessa tasa-arvoiseen metodiin ja topografisen analyysin käytössä, piilotetun totuuden paljastamisesta kieltäytymisenä. Ottaen nämä metodologiset huomiot vakavasti, en tarjoa tyhjää ja eksegeettistä luentaa Rancièren töistä, vaan ehdotuksen siitä, mitä Rancièrelainen esteettinen kasvatustavoitus voisi olla.

Luvuissa 2–5 paneudun Rancièren filosofisen projektin eri osiin. Ensimmäiseksi näytän tavan, jolla Rancière on ajatellut uudelleen emansipaation käsitteen tasa-arvoa todentavana toimintana. Sitten siirryn tutkimaan, mitä hän on kirjoittanut politiikasta perustavanlaatuisesti poleemisena prosessina. Rancièren käsite, aistillisen jako, näyttää ihmisyyshäviön ja politiikan prosessin luonteiden esteettisyyden. Näiden yhteyksien tutkiminen avaa viidennen luvun, joka siirtyy tarkastelemaan Rancièren taideteoreettisia kirjoituksia.

En halua nostaa Rancièrea mestarin asemaan filosofina, joka määrää mitä tulisi tehdä esimerkiksi kasvatuksessa tai politiikassa. Tämän takia lavastan kuudennessa luvussa kohtaamisen Rancièrelaisen teoretisoinnin ja taidekasvatusteoreetikko Jan Jagodzinskin ehdotusten välillä. Tällä hahmotan Rancièren aseman rajoja ja saavutan ymmärrystä siitä, mikä puuttuu tai on saanut vähän huomiota hänen työssään.

Aloitin seitsemännen luvun kartoittamalla aiempaa, omaa tutkimustani lähellä olevaa, taidekasvatustutkimusta. Keskityn anglo-amerikkalaiseen taidekasvatustutkimukseen. Tämän jälkeen esitän oman ehdotukseni. Rancièrelaisen esteettisen kasvatuksen tulee hyväksyä ihmisyyshäviön antagoinistinen luonne. Esteettinen, käsitteellisesti ihmisten yhdessäolon aistittavana kudelmana, liittyy vain rajoitetusti poliittiseen. Se voi muuttaa välittömästi aistisen jakoa taideteosten kautta tai avata uusia mahdollisuuksia dissensukselle. Esteettinen ei voi korvata politiikkaa. Tämä luo muitakin rajoitteita Rancièrelaiselle esteettiselle kasvatukselle, kuten että sen täytyy pysyä antiteleologisena.

Ehdotukseni pääasialliset rajoitteet ovat sen imperatiivi toimintaan, vähän teoretisoitu ajallinen ulottuvuus ja vapauden puuttuminen sen käsitteellisestä repertuaarista. Painavin ongelma ehdotukselleni on Rancièrelaisen esteettisen kasvatuksen soveltamisen tapojen, sen käytännön, löytäminen.

Tämä opinnäytetyö osoittaa kuinka Rancièrelaista teoretisointia voidaan käyttää taiteen ja taidekasvatuksen ajattelussa. Rancièren ajattelu tarjoaa käyttökelpoisen teoreettisen viitekehyksen kasvatukseen, taiteen ja politiikan yhteyksien tutkimiseksi.

Avainsanat Jacques Rancière, esteettinen kasvatustavoitus, kasvatustavoitusfilosofia, emansipaatio, politiikka, esteettinen, Rancièrelainen esteettinen kasvatustavoitus

Contents

1. Introduction	1
2. Method: Intervention	4
3. Equality of Intelligences: Intellectual Emancipation	9
4. Equality in Action: Rancièrian Politics	13
5. Equality and the Aesthetic	21
6. Polemics: Encounter with jagodzinski	29
7. Rancièrian Aesthetic Education	38
8. Conclusions	47
9. Sources	52

1. Introduction

Looking at society I find many things that contradict my understanding of what's right. There are many structures that fortify barriers, keep at bay and distribute privileges: they create or maintain inequality. To describe this cultural condition, I choose to refer to neoliberal capitalism. I feel the urge to state that something should be done.

But this is easily claimed, whereas providing clear cut outlines for action is harder. How to resist the all-encompassing capitalism in our lives? Consumer choice is just an illusory way of influencing society. In representational democracy, the right way of participation in the society is through using one's right to vote or posing as a candidate in the elections (and maybe exercising power as a representative afterwards). Demonstration as a concrete event dispersing to the urban milieu can also be seen as a good non-parliamentary way to effect choices of the Parliament. All of these function as a part of the system I'd like to criticize and work against. What could constitute an act that would work outside or against neoliberal capitalism? Or is it the assumption of the dichotomy between inside and outside even relevant?

This is the position that informs me as a political actor, and this is necessarily reflected in my conceptions of art education. According to art educator Pirkko Pohjakallio, a new interest toward critical pedagogy rose in our department in the beginning of the 2000s. This turn drew from critical pedagogy originating from Latin and North American contexts (Pohjakallio 2015, 67). This has been a major influence in my own positioning as an art educator, and its also reflected in my thesis.

In this work, I engage in-depth with the work of the French philosopher Jacques Rancière because I feel that Rancière's theoretical

approach offers a fruitful starting point for theorizing art education today. For him, the question animating most of his work is: where are we? which

“means two things at once: ‘how can we characterize the situation in which we live, think and act to-day?’, but also, by the same token: ‘how does the perception of this situation oblige us to reconsider the framework we use to “see” things and map situations, to move within this framework or get away from it?’; or, in other words, ‘how does it urge us to change our very way of determining the coordinates of the “here and now”?’” (Rancière 2009 b, 115.)

Following Rancière’s lead and asking the same questions, I find two questions urgent for a practitioner of art education. The cultural condition we live in leads to question what should be done otherwise or what could make a difference, how to change our way of being together. I choose to boil this down to “what can politics mean for art education?” Taking a cue from the tradition of critical pedagogies and progressive social movements, this leads to ask “what can emancipation mean today?” These two questions, in their own ways, have shaped my work on this thesis substantially. I argue that an inquiry into them can be facilitated by interrogating my main research question:

“What could Rancièrian aesthetic education be?”

At first, it’s not evident how the two questions come together in my main research question. This question is formulated through an engagement with Rancière’s thinking. Aesthetics refers to the way that he understands the entwinement of the politics of aesthetics and the aesthetics of politics. This is also exemplified in the way his key concept, distribution of the sensible, becomes key to understanding this relationship. Rancière’s theorizations have exhibited a close connection between politics and aesthetical practices and phenomena. Communities are for Rancière something that remain dependent on particular ways of perceiving. This is because these modalities guide the way individuals perceive, think and act in these constellations. Thus, modalities of perceiving and modes of participation are intricately connected. Rancière’s thinking also provides a new way for conceptualizing emancipation, also connected to aesthetics and politics.

What kind of a theory of aesthetic education can be elaborated by examining the three intertwined “scenes” of emancipatory education, politics and aesthetic regime of art? This thesis is configured as a path

taking the reader from Rancière's rethinking of emancipation, through the paradox of collective emancipation to the intertwining of politics and aesthetics. Through all of this I am able to work on the problematics of politics, art and its education within the same theoretical framework.

I have opted to work on a theoretical thesis. I engage with Rancière's writings and expose a reading which I justify by reference to his texts. This reading provides a theoretical framework in which concepts are defined, re-conceptualized and exposed to new relations to each other. I try to interrogate the possibilities and limits of this framework by making references to other concepts and theorizations. All of this means that my work's approach is philosophical: I present close readings of passages, present arguments backed up by logic alongside textual references. In short, I engage in a conceptual practice.

We can see that this approach creates limitations to what this work can engage with. I turn to conceptual issues, such as: What kind of relations can we think between art, politics and education? Are there concepts that describe these interconnections in fruitful ways? Where are we when we theorize with Rancière?

2. Method: Intervention

As my study is deeply indebted to Rancière's theorization, I examine my own methodological choices along presenting some ideas found from his writings on method. As I move on, I present my methodological choices by tracing their connections and disconnections, similarities and dissimilarities with Rancière's approach. I also discuss my work's methodological aims, choices and difficulties.

In my work, I don't aim to reference or reconstruct any exact part of Rancièrian theorization—I intend to weave my own “theoretical fabric” using the threads taken from Rancière's work. My work should not be read as an exegesis of the true meaning of Rancière's theorization. For example, my account of Rancièrian politics is gathered from across different works and thus doesn't represent a precise argument made by Rancière in a specific context. My aim is to put to use the thoughts Rancière has exposed.

Why do I position my interpretation as only a possible one? I claim that Rancière's method runs against exegetical thinking. To position oneself as explicating what Rancière really said just won't do. Rancière subscribes to “an egalitarian or anarchist theoretical position that does not presuppose this vertical relationship of top to bottom” (Rancière 2004, 50). So there's no foundation that is first laid out and then cultivated to a more exact or elaborate theoretical construction. This has to be understood in opposition to a position of mastery often assumed by intellectuals and theoreticians. For example, when a sociologist explains how an object of his study doesn't understand the conditions that restrains his or her life, a position of mastery is taken. The ignorance of the subject is assumed and the sociologist comes to say what's

the hidden truth behind appearances.

The “topography” Rancière is interested in consists “of horizontal distributions, combinations between systems of possibilities, not in terms of surface and substratum.” (Rancière 2004, 50.) This is the main reason I want to articulate my interpretation as only a possible one. Taking seriously Rancière’s claims about his method means refusing to expose a foundation of Rancièrian theorization and denying the possibility of explaining what he has really said. Nevertheless, I of course defend my interpretation and feel that it’s justified.

In his writings, Rancière constructs “a changing map of a moving landscape, a map that is ceaselessly modified by the movement itself.” In this process, concepts don’t stay static but are “instable.” (Rancière 2009 b, 120.) This becomes evident in Rancière’s *Disagreement* (1999). In the course of his argument, Rancière constantly refines and modifies the concepts he uses. Different knots are unraveled as new ones manifest. Same historical events gain new meanings as they are revisited at other parts of the development. This is another reason presenting a definite and conclusive interpretation of Rancière’s work runs into problems.

Rancière recounts several things that make up the method of a thinker: “the issues they address, the materials they select, the givens they consider significant, the phrasing of their connection, the landscape they map, their way of inventing solutions (or aporias)” (Rancière 2009 b, 114).

What’s very particular in Rancière’s method, is the way he

“always constructs his argumentation as a re-staging of a limited number of such scenes or events of discourse. It is also important to remark that he introduces no hierarchy in the selection of its scenes.” (Rancière 2009 b, 117.)

This is evident for example in his choice of scenes in *Disagreement* (1999). Events of microhistory are analyzed alongside figures like Plato and Hobbes—without a greater weight put on any one of them. This is a concrete example of how the egalitarian method works in the way Rancière chooses his materials. Enunciations from worker’s journals are treated with the same precision as textual extracts from the canonized philosophers of the Western tradition. This could be seen as verifying some kind of equality—maybe theoretical equality?

When discussing theoretical work on emancipation, Rancière states that it’s necessary to “break the distribution of disciplines. This epistemological imperative is also a political one. To posit thought as some-

thing that denies the separations among philosophical argumentation, historical explanation and literary statements is to define it as a power shared by just anyone.” (Rancière 2011, 23.) From this, we can see that, for Rancière, there’s some kind of connection with his practice of theory and the theoretical constructions themselves. His emphasis on equality shines through his work as methodological choices.

Rancière uses the metaphor of a path to describe a thinker’s method:

“A method means a path: not the path that a thinker follows but the path that he/she constructs, that you have to construct to know where you are, to figure out the characteristics of the territory you are going through, the places it allows you to go, the way it obliges you to move, the markers that can help you, the obstacles that get in the way.” (Rancière 2009 b, 114.)

Next, I want to briefly go over the path I’ve constructed from my encounter with Rancière. My work is organized into chapters. The textual tracing of my intellectual journey continues from this look into method to the restaging of the tale of Joseph Jacotot in chapter 3. The fundamentals of critical pedagogy were put under question during this encounter as the relations between knowledge and emancipation, the teacher and the student, were evaluated.

The logic of intellectual emancipation cannot be converted to a logic of social organization without reversing its prime motor; turning equality into inequality. Jacotot’s convictions bring to light the tension between the individual and the community, intellectual emancipation and collective emancipation. This opens up the road to politics, discussed in chapter 4.

Well before the more recent extended engagement with art, Rancière has studied how there is a fundamentally aesthetic side in the way communities organize themselves. Claims to power are made through different kinds of enunciations, the allocations of bodies manifest as visibility and invisibility, workers’ emancipation shows itself as aesthetic contemplation and so on. The fifth chapter is opened by exploring this connection between politics and aesthetics. From there, focus shifts to the art theoretical discussions.

Rancière doesn’t see his writings as presenting theories of art or aesthetics. Instead, he sees them as “polemical interventions” because “they imply a polemical view of what ideas are and do.” Rancière aim, in any given situation, is to shift our attention to what “is the polemical nature that makes it an object of thinking, that situates it in a field of tensions”. As an example, his works on politics explores instances

where disputes are raised, like when the meaning of democracy is contested. This means that he “is only interested in ideas at work.” (Rancière 2009 b, 115–116.)

It is following this idea of polemical intervention, that I have opted to stage an encounter between my reading of Rancièrian theory and the proposals of art education theorist Jan Jagodzinski. My aim is to interrogate the limits of my theoretical framework formed in the previous chapters by this move: to see what needs further theorization. This is also an attempt in using egalitarian method. Rancière is not taken to have said everything as the philosopher. Instead, Jagodzinski’s project is seen as a challenge to Rancièrian theorization, asking: “did you think about this?”

In the seventh chapter, I gather the threads picked up so far and weave a novel theoretical patchwork from it: a proposal for what Rancièrian aesthetic education could be. Rancière states that “[a] foundation [...] is always a ‘might be’ or an ‘as if’, which is reached afterwards, at the end of a process” (Rancière 2009 b, 119). This is reflected in my research question as I don’t want to provide a new foundation for art education theory in the ontological sense. I’m looking into what Rancièrian aesthetic education could be – and not what it is.

My thesis is theoretical. I carve out a theoretical framework through my reading of Rancière’s work. This tries not to be conclusive, since I think that would run against Rancière’s method, as I’ve mentioned. I define concepts, reformulate them in new contexts, look at how their positions shift in regard to one another and carve out their limits. I try to interrogate the possibilities and limits of this framework by making references to other concepts and theorizations. All of this means that my work’s approach is philosophical: I present close readings of passages, put forth arguments backed up by logic alongside textual references and engage in a conceptual practice.

This means that the work is restricted in several ways. Its material are philosophical texts and research articles. Text itself becomes an apparatus for exposing the conceptual practice I have engaged in. The philosophical approach makes it difficult to, for example, tackle questions about the utilization of new media in art classrooms or the changes in curriculum design in the Finnish context.

As such, my philosophical thesis aims at putting to use insights from Rancière’s work. It should be seen as a theoretical intervention. It is an attempt to examine ways of conceptualizing key concepts for art education: concepts like art, the aesthetic, politics and emancipation. I argue that these can be seen in a useful theoretical constellation when

viewed as Rancièrian aesthetic education.

In the last chapter, Conclusions, I recapitulate insights from my journey. I look to the conceptual landscape formed by the conceptual practice of philosophizing. I ask, what does the view contain and what can be seen shimmering at the edges? I speculate on what could be different, what could be rendered more visible and what might lie outside, what I wasn't able to bring to light. I return to the considerations on method and evaluate what I did.

3. Equality of Intelligences: Intellectual Emancipation

As educational philosophers Charles Bingham and Gert Biesta note, the historical roots of the term emancipation go as far back as the Roman law. As they explain, emancipation meant the legal act through which the father of a family relinquished his legal authority over his son. “Emancipation literally means to give away ownership (ex: away; mancipium: ownership). More broadly, it means to relinquish one’s authority over someone. This implies that the ‘object’ of emancipation, that is, the person to be emancipated, becomes independent and free as a result of the act of emancipation.” (Bingham, Biesta 2010, 27.)

Through the tradition of enlightenment, the notion of emancipation entered critical and progressivist pedagogies. In this context, emancipation from power relations becomes important. This is a problem of knowledge, since “emancipation can be brought about if people gain an adequate insight into the power relations that constitute their situation – which is why the notion of ‘demystification’ plays a central role in critical pedagogies.” (Bingham and Biesta 2010, 28–29.)

Ideology is, according to Biesta and Bingham, the key insight of Marxism in educational discussions. Ideology provides a way to elaborate a logic of emancipation, what Biesta and Bingham have dubbed the modern idea of emancipation. Ideology is something that works on peoples’ minds secretly, without them being aware of its functioning.

This “means that in order for us to achieve emancipation, someone else, whose consciousness is not subjected to the workings of power, needs to provide us with an account of our objective condition.” This comes down to the dependence of the one in need of emancipation to the one with the right consciousness. (Bingham and Biesta 2010, 26.) This modern conception of emancipation is formally asymmetrical. There’s a Marxist intellectual, that knows what the others don’t and needs to come and rescue them – to emancipate them. It’s arguable that a similar view outlines in one way or another critical pedagogies. A way out of this conception of emancipation is outlined in Rancière’s writings on education.

Rancière’s principal work on the topic of education is *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*¹, published originally in 1987. According to Rancière himself, the book was written as a response to the denial of the possibilities of emancipation and conjunction with the evaluation of socialist tradition in the French intellectual field of the time (Rancière 2009 a, 115).

The *Ignorant Schoolmaster* recounts the story of Joseph Jacotot, who in 1818 discovered something that shattered his views on education. He had witnessed Dutch students learn French without anyone instructing them. Jacotot had only given them, from his view, an unsurmountable task of learning the language French from a bilingual edition of a book, *Les Aventures de Télémaque* by Fénelon. To his surprise the students not only learned to discuss *Télémaque* in French but also composed essays on its topics. Having believed that learning always demands explication from the part of a teacher, Jacotot’s world was shaken: no knowledge was transmitted via explication, but the students nevertheless learned. (Rancière 1991, 1–3.)

Not content with leaving the issue at this, Jacotot continued his investigation. Experience with not-teaching French successfully put under question the whole logic of explication, that of seeing learning as transmitting knowledge to the students. Jacotot went further and tried to teach that which he didn’t know, that which he ignored. (Rancière 1991, 101.)

Jacotot dubbed his method universal teaching and it roused

1 Rancière’s *Ignorant Schoolmaster* can be seen as taking part in a discussion on French schooling, and its inadequacy and plans for its reform, since the 1960s. Rancière criticized especially the position put forth by Bourdieu and his followers. On Rancière’s own statement of the critique against Bourdieu’s pedagogical revisionism, see e.g. (Rancière 2010 b, 10-12), another account of the context is provided by the translator’s introduction by Kristin Ross.

far-reaching polemic in his days — word of this new “method” circulated in Europe and reached as far as Rio de Janeiro. According to Jacotot’s principles, anyone could teach anything to anyone. It didn’t matter if one didn’t have knowledge of the subject and in this fashion illiterate parents were able to teach their children how to read and write. The starting point was something that the pupil had knowledge of, e.g. a prayer learned by heart. This was epitomized by his maxim “everything is in everything”. (Rancière 1991, 18, 31.)

The act of universal teaching consisted of the simple steps of demanding and verifying. The schoolmaster was there just to loan his/her will to the learner. This was a crucial step. In traditional tutelage, in Jacotot’s words stultification, two intellects were connected. The stultifying master subjugated the students’ intelligence to his or her own. The master had the knowledge of the gap that forever separated them. This resulted in the student never being able to close the gap: there’s always more to learn, more to explain, a bit more distance to close. (Rancière 1991, 13.)

In stultification the gap between the two intellects was verified by the intermittent acts of explication. The master explicator promises fill the gap with his explications but this never happens, there’s always a new explication needed. Thus the explicative logic becomes never ending. (Rancière 1991, 4–9.) But how can this vicious cycle be overcome?

What’s crucial from Rancière’s point of view, is the difference Jacotot introduced as regard to the assumptions of the schoolmaster. Master explicator always assumes the inequality between him/herself and the student, that is, inequality of intellects is assumed. Jacotot runs counter to this. According to universal teaching, all intellects are equal. In the act itself, the assumed equality is verified: the learner is capable of the same things as the others are capable of—even the master of the pedagogical relationship. (Rancière 1991, 4, 39.)

In Jacotot’s method knowledge was uncoupled from the act of emancipation. It was no longer a case of distributing the knowledge about the real conditions of the emancipated. Emancipation becomes the act of verification of the equality of intelligence of anyone. Nor was it the case that a veil of “false consciousness” was lifted. This is how the modern conception of emancipation is sidestepped by Rancière-Jacotot.

Failed experimented, such as application of the method in a military academy, convinced Jacotot to view his method as something that could never provide a social logic. Jacotot went on to note that intellectual emancipation could never result in a social logic: it would only prepare people to live as emancipated in a world ridden with

social inequality. Trying to force equality into the social would result in transforming it into equality. This is because Jacotot equates social logic with the logic of explanation: “it is a way in which the social order is presented and reproduced.” (Rancière 1991, 79, 102–103, see also Rancière 2010 b, 6–9.)

So it seems that we are running into a kind of problem for the art educator committed to social change. “The act that emancipates an intelligence has, on its own, no effect on the social order” (Rancière 2010 b, 14–15). If one accepts Rancière’s proposal of sidestepping the problems of the modern conception of emancipation, one encounters the problem of not having any way to improve or even change the social reality. This seems to be reinforced by Rancière’s statement at the end of *On Ignorant Schoolmasters*, presented in Rio de Janeiro State University in June of 2002, returning to the themes explored in *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*:

“Affirmation of these simple principles in fact constitutes an unprecedented dissonance, a dissonance one must, in a way, forget in order to continue improving schools, programs and pedagogies, but that one must also, from time to time, listen to again so that the act of teaching does not lose sight of the paradoxes that give it meaning.” (Rancière 2010 b, 15–16.)

So the promise of intellectual emancipation falls short of being a guideline towards some utopian community. It remains something necessarily tied to the individual level. But this was the case for intellectual emancipation. But how has Rancière treated the social or the political in his writings? Can we gain a further understanding of emancipation from there?

4. Equality in Action: Rancièrian Politics

Rancière has not tried to introduce another political theory or a doctrine of political philosophy by his writings on the topic. Neither has he started out from a general theory of the subject nor from ontological principles, and then gone on to elaborate another political theory. (Rancière 2009 b, 114, 117–118.)

What he has tried is to do, is to

“reconstruct not a political theory but a dramaturgy of politics. Between the contemporary aporias of consensus and this formula it is possible to weave the main threads of a dramaturgy of politics, conceived out of its limits, a dramaturgy of politics conceived as the development of this paradox of ‘power without power’ that is meant by the word ‘democracy.’” (Rancière 2009 b, 119.)

This dramaturgy happens by exploring different “‘extreme’ forms of staging of democracy.” Through this, “we can frame an understanding of the polemical relationships between the structures of constitutional governments and the forms of autonomous political action. We can also draw from it an orientation for democratic action: democratic action is the form of action which carries out the disruption of any ultimate legitimacy of power, or, if you turn it on its positive side, the affirmation of the equal capacity of anybody.” (Rancière 2009 b, 120.) Already from this we can see that for Rancière, politics is radical in the

sense that it disrupts the legitimacy of existing institutions. There's also a close connection between his understanding of politics and equality.

Rancière sees that his works on politics form a sort of continuum with the previous works (*The Nights of Labour* and *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*) that re-examined the concept of emancipation. He sees views the works on emancipation and equality as a sort-of starting point for his writings on politics (from *On the Shores of Politics* to *Disagreement*). These writings should of course be understood in their historical context. Rancière remarks that the fall of the “Soviet Empire” marked a shift in theoretical discussions from “the debate on the virtues or crimes of Marxism” to “the thesis of the ‘end of history’ achieved in the global triumph of consensual democracy. But as consensual, liberal democracy was hailed as triumphant, Rancière points out that at the same time there were “new ethnic and religious wars in former communist countries and the new forms of racism and xenophobia in so-called ‘democratic countries.’” (Rancière 2009 b, 115.)

For Rancière, politics is not some external sphere separate from other aspects of human life. It's not the phenomenon unfolding in the parliament of a nation state. Nor is it the people's voice coming out in elections, no matter how inclusively the population has the right to participate. And contrary to what's usually thought, it's not the exercise of power. Politics is “a specific mode of action that is enacted by a specific subject and that has its own proper rationality.” (Rancière 2010 a, 27, emphasis in original.) So politics is for Rancière above all else action—not just some ideal to be attained or some sort of static configuration of institutions and positions.

Politics is definable because of its form. It is always a clash of two logics, two counts of the community and two distributions of the sensible (Rancière 2010 a, 39.) In Rancière's words, the distribution of the sensible is

”the system of self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it. A distribution of the sensible therefore establishes at one and the same time something common that is shared and exclusive parts. This apportionment of parts and positions is based on a distribution of spaces, times, and forms of activity that determines the very manner in which something in common lends itself to participation and in what way various individuals have a part in this distribution.” (Rancière 2004, 12.)

A distribution of the sensible is in a sense an “implicit law” that shapes the way we perceive the world around us. Through affecting our sensory experience, this distribution renders things and agents visible or invisible. It prescribes modes of being and roles in the community. (Rancière 2010 a, 36.) In this way, the distribution of the sensible designates the framework in which human life is lived in.

According to Rancière, politics is not necessary – in fact, “it occurs as an always provisional accident within the history of forms of domination.” In the usual case, human communities are organized according to the logic of domination. Those that possess the qualifications to rule, do that, while others are subjugated to their power. The qualifications differ from the specific community and time. Nonetheless, some principle for having the right to rule exists. Politics runs against this. It “exists as a deviation from this normal order of things.” (Rancière 2010 a, 35.)

This usual “order of things” is a certain distribution of the sensible. It is based on an inegalitarian logic and Rancière calls it the police. It doesn’t designate simply the law enforcing agent, nor is it equivalent to the state apparatus. Rather, it is a distribution of the sensible which states that “society here is made up of groups tied to specific modes of doing, to places in which these occupations are exercised, and to modes of being corresponding to these occupations and these places.” (Rancière 2010 a, 37.) So the practices of nation states rely on the police but are simply reduced to them (Rancière 1999, 29.) The police proposes a view of the community that is static and all-encompassing. Everyone has a place and a role in this distribution. Each is acknowledged as part of a certain group and the “image” of the community as a whole is achieved.

But the police is not only this order, it is also “the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution.” So the police is also the process that produces the “image” of the community and forces its sustenance. In addition to the implementation, it also provides a justification for its own existence. (Rancière 1999, 28.)

In its totalizing function, the police states that everyone has a place, everyone has a role and that each has been counted. So the police comes down to a count of the community devoid of any void. There’s no room for any surplus, because this would create a fracture to the order—destabilizing the whole constellation and putting its justification into question. (Rancière 2010 a, 37.)

In a liberal democracy, politics is often viewed, in more or less, as follows: there is a decision making body, which “represents” the community at large. This is how the partition into those that rule and those that are ruled is legitimized. As part of this, every citizen has a right to vote in the elections. The governing body has thus a justification to make decisions that regulate all the individuals that make up the community. Laws are formulated, which mold the positions and interactions between the individuals. Thus the distribution partitions places and roles through legislation. This illustrates some of the ways that the police works in a liberal democracy. If a picture like this is held to describe a political system, then the police is mistaken for politics.

For Rancière, police is always in opposition to the process of politics. However, this does not mean that the police is necessarily something simply and totally bad. According to Rancière, we can compare different polices, and “one kind of police may be infinitely preferable to another.” (Rancière 1999, 30–31.) This makes sense. Take for example a police that simply exterminates nonconformists, and one that places heavy economic sanctions on them. It seems evident that, without further details, the first one should be deemed worse.

The process of politics starts when the distribution of the sensible as the police is put into question. This happens by “disturbing this arrangement by supplementing it with a part of those without part, identified with the whole of the community” (Rancière 2010 a, 37).

But how is this questioning conducted?

What politics does, according to Rancière, is to configure its own space. Since there’s no natural or original place for politics to happen (like some institution or part of the state apparatus), it has to create an event for its own appearance—to show its subjects and operations. This happens through the “manifestation of dissensus as the presence of two worlds in one.” Dissensus means “a gap in the sensible itself” – the story told by the police is not everything. The two worlds don’t simply display different opinions or interests. It’s not a dialog in which groups compare their differing views. “Political demonstration makes visible that which had no reason to be seen; it places one world in another.” This means that the demonstration shows something that’s already existing in the world. It shows something that has been rendered invisible in the distribution of the sensible. (Rancière 2010 a, 37–38. emphasis original).

“Dissensus brings back into play both the obviousness of what can be perceived, thought and done, and the distribution of those who

are capable of perceiving, thinking and altering the coordinates of the shared world. This is what a process of political subjectivation consists in: in the action of uncounted capacities that crack open the unity of the given and the obviousness of the visible in order to sketch a new topography of the possible.” (Rancière 2009 a, 49.)

So what is the subject of politics that gains a stage for appearance through dissensus? It is the empty operator: the demos as “[t]he people that comprises the subject of democracy” But this does not designate any subgroup of the community bound together by similar interests, because that would just fall back to the police’s partitioning of places. The “demos is the supplementary part in relation to every count of the parts of the population, making it possible to identify ‘the count of the uncounted’ with the whole of the community.” (Rancière 2010 a, 33, emphasis original.)

The police operates in order to provide a totalizing account. It parcels out roles and places for everyone. Since politics runs counter to this, it has to compromise the police (ac)count. This means making visible the ones that have been rendered invisible in the count, and it is here that the demos, as the empty operator, comes to play. Paradoxically the demos is comprised of the ones that have no part in the community; the ones that are not counted. Through becoming visible, they present themselves as the whole of the community. In Rancière’s words:

“The ‘all’ of the community named by democracy is an empty, supplementary part that separates the community out from the sum of the parts of the social body. This initial separation founds politics as the action of supplementary subjects, inscribed as a surplus in relation to every count of the parts of society.” (Rancière 2010 a, 33.)

This appearance of the people should not be understood as something illusory and therefore opposed to reality. The common field of experience as the distribution of the sensible is something that’s put under question by the appearance of the people. The police account becomes compromised. (Rancière 1999, 99.)

But what’s democracy doing here? In the context of Rancièrian theory, it’s not what it’s usually taken to be. Here, democracy is not a certain way of governance. Nor is it equitable to certain institutions. It is “the very regime of politics itself as a form of relationship that defines a specific subject.” (Rancière 2010 a, 31.)

The communities that are set up as the result of the playing out of

politics are polemical communities—they are the result of the clash of two distinct logics: “the police logic of the distribution of places and the political logic of the egalitarian act.” (Rancière 1999, 100.)

Equality takes the form of a wrong in the process of politics. It’s as the wrong that the universal of equality gains its political significance. This fundamental wrong cannot be settled because it’s something undeterminable. Equality is not some endpoint for political action, it’s simply the assumption that needs to be verified. As this verification is endless and the police can’t do anything but resist it, the wrong cannot be swiped away or treated. It can only be processed through the taking place of politics. Equality as the wrong provides the meeting point of the two logics that make up politics. (Rancière 1999, 39.)

Political subjects are the product of subjectivation². This happens “through a series of actions of a body and a capacity for enunciation not previously identifiable within a given field of experience, whose identification is thus part of the reconfiguration of the field of experience.” (Rancière 1999, 35.) The “new” body Rancière talks about has to assert itself as something not parceled out in the distribution of the sensible.

As a certain distribution parcels out roles, it also inscribes identities. A subject is provided with an identity, guaranteeing a place in the given order. A subjectivation always happens through a dis-identification, as “a removal from the naturalness of a place, the opening up of a subject space where anyone can be counted since it is the space where those of no account are counted, where a connection is made between having a part and having no part.” As one dis-identification happens, the whole distribution that has prescribed the now rejected identification is put under question. Because the whole distribution is threatened, is the subject position open for other subjectivations to happen. This doesn’t create subjects “ex nihilo” because it’s always a transformation or a displacement taking place in the distribution of the sensible. (Rancière 1999, 36.)

Political subjectivation opens up “a subject space where anyone can be counted since it is the space where those of no account are counted, where a connection is made between having a part and having no part.” Because the dis-identification happens in relation to the distribution of the sensible, it necessarily happens in relation to the community. Thus, “A political subjectivation is the product of these multiple fracture lines by which individuals and networks of individuals subjec-

2 I’ve decided to use the word *subjectivation*, even though some of my citation use a different translation (e.g. subjectification) of the French term *la subjectivation*.

tify the gap between their condition as animals endowed with a voice and the violent encounter with the equality of the logos.” (Rancière 1999, 36–37.) This means that when political subjectivation opens up, it’s available to everyone.

Politics doesn’t itself have any space or some special qualification that would demarcate it clearly from other kinds of activities. But politics” happens by means of a principle that does not belong to it: equality.” This doesn’t mean that equality would be some ideal to be attained or the utopian endpoint. “It is a mere assumption that needs to be discerned within the practices implementing it.” (Rancière 1999, 33.)

The process of politics disrupts the police as the distribution of the sensible. The clash of the two logics, that of equality and the inegalitarian opposite, brings about “inscriptions of equality.” In this way the distribution of the sensible is reconfigured. The Declaration of the Rights of Man [sic] is one example Rancière mentions. These inscriptions alter the common world itself and also provide platforms or starting points for further politics.³ (Rancière 1999, 42, 87.) The police is not overthrown as in a revolution. The old order is not substituted by a new one. But nonetheless something has changed. New roles in the distribution might have been opened up. Or bodies might have shifted places. Or someone’s opinion might be recognized as of value. (Rancière 1999, 29–30.) As the process of politics plays out, something positive happens.

All of this comes down to revealing the contingency of any social order imposed by the police through the process of political subjectivation. (Rancière 1999, 101.) This is what we could call collective eman-

3 This needs to be stressed: things like the Declaration of the Rights of Man or the concept of human rights have their significance only in their relation to the process of politics. Rancière doesn’t see them as something having “intrinsic” worth. These rights in fact only mean something “[w]hen such groups [as e.g. clandestine immigrants] can [...] make something of these rights to construct a dissensus against the denial of rights they suffer.” Rancière has also attacked Giorgio Agamben’s position on human rights. Without going to too much detail, I state that Rancière’s critique centers on how he perceives Agamben reducing the paradigm of *right* to something that is necessarily guaranteed by a sovereign (e.g. a modern state), which in turn subjugates the one the right “belongs” to. Rancière sees that this kind of thinking doesn’t allow rights to have any “positive” merit in politics. (Rancière 2010 c, 71.) An exact presentation of Rancière’s position and critique is found in the article just cited.

icipation⁴ in a Rancièrian context. It's simply the process of politics unfolding as the polemical verification of equality of anyone. Rancière's succinct statement of this:

“Collective understanding of emancipation is not the comprehension of a total process of subjection. It is the collectivization of capacities invested in scenes of dissensus. It is the employment of the capacity of anyone whatsoever, of the quality of human beings without qualities.” (Rancière 2009 a, 49.)

In *Disagreement*, the longest elaboration on politics by Rancière, Rancière sees that even the smallest inscriptions of equality are significant. They are marks of that “the power of the people, exists.” For him, “The problem is to extend the sphere of this materialization, to maximize this power”, which “means creating litigious cases and worlds of community in litigation by demonstrating the difference of the people from itself under whatever specifications.” (Rancière 1999, 87—88.)

Bingham and Biesta go on to make a connection between all of this and emancipation. Since the intellectual emancipation of Jacotot consisted of actions verifying the equality of intelligences, so can the process of politics be seen as a process of verifying equality. As this happens through dissensus and subjectivation, “emancipation can be understood as a process of subjectification [sic].” (Bingham and Biesta 2010, 33.) Jan Voelker sees also that *Disagreement*, is an effort to show that “[e]mancipation can then be thought at the level of communities” (Voelker 2011, 68).

So politics is for Rancière first and foremost action. Verification of equality, creating inscriptions of equality in different manifestations. This through the process of subjectivation with, dissensus as the manifestation of two worlds in one is its' starting place. The clash between two logics, the “meeting of police logic and egalitarian logic that is never set up in advance.” (Rancière 1999, 32). So virtually anything can become the stage for politics. The workplace, immigration bureau or the art classroom. But next, I want to turn to what I find most interesting in Rancière's work: the way he sees the intertwining of aesthetics and politics.

4 Rancière has elsewhere used the notion of “social emancipation” in connection with workers' emancipation. In that context, what becomes important is the individual worker's relation to his or her occupation and the restrictions evident in it. (Rancière 2009, 42.) This seems to be different from collective emancipation, but nonetheless the connection is close.

5. Equality and the Aesthetic

Rancière sees his writings on aesthetics as continuing the path already embarked on in his writings on politics. This means that one of the motivations for a focus on the aesthetic was to elaborate on “thinking of politics in terms of ‘distribution of the sensible’”. Another arose from an opposition to the postmodern as “a form of global description of a time and a world deprived of any perspective of collective emancipation.” (Rancière 2009 b, 115–116.)

In *A few remarks on the method of Jacques Rancière*, Rancière elaborates on his use of the word “aesthetic”. The choice of word lends to ambiguity, which of course is not an accident. First, it refers to the aesthetic regime of art, which I’ll return to shortly. Second, it names “a dimension of human experience in general.” In this latter sense, it refers to what the senses can perceive. It follows that the connection between “the aesthetic” and politics is twofold. First, there are certain ways in which the aesthetic names “specific forms of linkage existing between the forms of the aesthetic regime and the modern forms of politics -- [and] the way in which political actions and conflicts are conflicts about the distribution of the sensible.” (Rancière 2009 b, 121.) The latter connection has been treated in more detail on the chapter on politics. The distribution of the sensible is always aesthetic in nature: as it prescribes positions, it acknowledges who’s thought of as a speaking being and whose not. When it discloses a count of the community, it renders the recognized visible and denies visibility from those not

taken into account. In this way, there's a straightforward link between the aesthetic and the process of politics.

Rancière refers to a regime of art as something constituted by several things. Certain objects, forms and so on have to be acknowledged as forms of art and not as something else. This happens by recognizing certain practices as artistic practices. In this way, a regime of art is meshed together with a certain distribution of the sensible. The distribution parcels out roles for artists, just as it does the roles of factory workers. (Rancière 2011, 18.)

Rancière's aim has not been to propose all-encompassing frameworks, but to write about how something has come to be seen as art, how the possibility of viewing something as art has come to be. This means "at one and the same to historicize the transcendental and to de-historicize these systems of conditions of possibility." The regimes should not be thought of as delimiting certain historical periods—even though their conditions of possibility can be seen as emerging from historical events. Several different regimes in fact exist at any one time and certain works can even display characteristics of more than one. (Rancière 2011, 18.)

Rancière has distinguished three different regimes of art: the ethical, representational (or poetic) and the aesthetic regimes (Rancière 2004, 20). What concerns my study the most is the last regime, but for purposes of describing it, I'll shortly introduce the two others.

In the ethical regime, art doesn't exist as a recognized and distinct sphere of practice. For example, images are made, not art works. What becomes paramount is how images effect the individuals and the community they make up. Do the images create illusions by projecting a false simulacrum? Rancière cites Plato's opposition to the pictorial arts, theatre and some forms of literature to give an example. (Rancière 2004, 20–21.)

Aristotle's writings on mimesis provide the prime example of the representative or poetic regime of art. Poetic, referring to ancient Greek concept of poiesis, because certain practices, "ways of doing and making", are brought together under the label of art. And representative, because these practices are delimited from other kinds by their adherence to the mimetic principle. This principle declares first that it is imitations that count as artistic productions. Second, it orders the different imitations according to their substance matter, tragedy as the high point of all art. It is because mimesis situated clearly the arts within the social reality, that is the distribution of the sensible, that the arts could for the first time be named and be seen as something auton-

omous. (Rancière 2004, 22–23.)

Whereas the representative regime posited the correspondence between subject matter and artistic form, the aesthetic regime marks the disconnection of these two. Rancière cites Flaubert's *Emma Bovary* in exemplifying this disconnection: the love affairs of a common woman became the subject of literature. Thus whatever could be represented in whatever medium and manner. (Rancière 2004, 32.)

This also marks the break between the relation of poesis and aisthesis. By poesis, Rancière refers to the ways of making. Aisthesis makes a connection between different faculties: between “feeling and understanding, which means the connection between a capacity of feeling and a capacity of understanding (Rancière 2009 b, 121). This break comes down to there being “no more rules allowing us to say why things are beautiful or not, no more presupposition of a correspondence between the rules of art and the laws of sensibility” (Rancière 2011, 12). This break is not only limited to experiences of works of art but it amounts to a disruption in the logic of the police (Rancière 2009 b, 121). Thus the aesthetic regime marks the disruption of the distribution of the sensible that based the demarcation underlying the representative regime.

The aesthetic regime provides several ways in which artistic practices or art works can disrupt the distribution of the sensible. An aesthetic form of equality can disrupt the way works are evaluated on the base of their subject matter. This breaks the way the works were “appreciated according to rules of taste defined by a specific public.” The museum setting exemplifies this. In a museum, any visitor may view any of the works there. Prior, the same works (e.g. portraits of monarchs) might have been only subjected to the appreciation of nobles. The works lend themselves unconditionally to an undifferentiated gaze—the gaze of anyone at all. Thus we have “a form of equality which is not, strictly speaking, political equality, but nevertheless contributes to the reframing of the common landscape, to the reframing of the distribution of the possible.” Since new people are admitted to have the capabilities of seeing required to contemplate the work, the distribution of the sensible is altered. New capabilities are allocated to bodies which were not affiliated with them previously. (Rancière 2009 b, 121–122.)

The art of the aesthetic regime thus relies on “the implementation of a certain equality” (Rancière 2004, 52–53). But if aesthetic equality is something different from the equality at the heart of politics, what's the nature of the connection between the aesthetic and the political?

There are two ways in which the aesthetic can “do” politics. First,

the aesthetic “tends to break through the surface of political forms of equality to reach true equality or rather to dismiss equality in favor of the sympathy or fraternity of the subterranean drives or impersonal rhythms and intensities of collective life” (Rancière 2009 b, 122). This is because somehow, Rancière tells, the equality at play in the art of the aesthetic regime, differs from equality in the process of politics. This means that there’s a danger of replacing politics with something else, namely replacing political equality with aesthetic equality, thus rendering politics inoperative.

Second, the aesthetic can contribute to making new forms of political subjectivation thinkable by “the reframing of forms of experience” (Rancière 2009 b, 122). This is the result of the close connection between politics and aesthetics already examined. In an article called *Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community* (2009), Rancière has further elaborated on the possibilities of thinking about the connections between subjectivation, politics, communities and the aesthetic. This is done in the context of the history of art and artistic practices. I now turn to this development of thought.

Let’s take a small step back to the aesthetic regime of art. Rancière has declared that the aesthetic relies on a twofold separation. First, the art work doesn’t any longer have a certain function that prescribes the adequate form. Its destination no longer prescribes its form, as was the case in the representative regime. For example, peasants portrayed in genre paintings had to stand less impressive to the portraits of the patrons that ordered them. The nobler the subject of painting, the more prestigious the form had to be, also expressed by choosing more valuable pigments. Thus the form followed function and destination. (Rancière 2009 a, 69–70.)

The second “separation” refers to the way the work is situated in the distribution of the sensible. The work is no longer dependent on a certain partition “of social places and functions.” The poetic side of the representative regime entailed that artistic practices are recognized as a distinct sphere of activity: they are a way of doing and making in their own part. The aesthetic regime blurs the boundary between art and non-art. As anything can become the subject of art, this can now happen by any means. And this is what breaks the dependence of artistic practices on a certain distribution of the sensible. Since there’s no definite way to separate the ways of making specific to the arts, they can no longer be accounted for in the distribution of the sensible in an exhaustive way. Thus the arts no longer rely on any determinate distribution. (Rancière 2009 a, 70.)

But what do these two separations and aesthetic efficacy have to do with communities and political subjectivation? Rancière describes three propositions that all display being together in being apart, being separated but paradoxically tied together at the same time. The second proposition⁵ taken up by Rancière is an art project realized in a Parisian suburb by an artist group *Campement Urbain* (Urban Encampment.) In the project, *I and Us*, the habitants of the area were invited to plan a place for quiet meditation and being alone—something that's not a usual action in the lives of the people. Paradoxically the project established a community around the activities of planning a space for solitude, separation from the others. (Rancière 2009 a, 53–54.)

The paradoxical communities of separation are aesthetic communities. “Human beings are tied together by a certain sensory fabric, a certain distribution of the sensible, which defines their way of being together” and were already familiar with the implications for politics. This means that “[a]n aesthetic community – is a community of sense.” (Rancière 2009 a, 56–57.) So the aesthetic community is a community that's woven together by a certain distribution of the sensible.

The aesthetic communities explored in more detail by Rancière, like the *I and Us*-project, take the form of a dissensual community (Rancière 2009 a, 57–58). But what should we make of this?

I would argue that Rancière sees several ways in which the *I and Us*-project works in a dissensual manner. First, as an aesthetic art work, it functions through a dissensual operation, that “takes the form of a superimposition that transforms a given form or body into a new one.” This means that the work acts as if it were something it's not: it pretends to be separated from everyday experience, but in fact, it's made up of the everyday experience of the people involved in it. In the aesthetic regime of art, there's no distinctive boundary between the everyday experience and aesthetic experience. (Rancière 2009 a, 66–67.)

Second, the art work's form is that of a dissensual figure, one established through a separation. This happens through the form of a “‘dissensual figure’ of the community: staging of “a conflict between two regimes of sense, two sensory worlds.” (Rancière 2009 a, 58.) The quiet spot of the art work is juxtaposed to the busy life of the suburb. “To the extent that it is a dissensual community, an aesthetic community is a community structured by disconnection” (Rancière 2009 a,

5 The first being a statement from Mallarmé's prose poem, *The White Water Lily*, and the third a citation from Deleuze's and Guattari's *What Is Philosophy?* (Rancière 2009 a, 51–57).

59). What keeps the members separated, actually becomes the thing uniting them.

We already know from chapter 4 how Rancière sees dissensus. It is the manifestation of two worlds in one, which opens up a stage for politics to happen. Dissensus enables political subjectivation. Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community proposes some ways to see dissensus in the context of art, and this will be my focus next.

Rancière stresses that “[u]nderstanding exactly what is disconnected [in the dissensual community] and what is at stake in that disconnection is crucial to interpreting what ‘aesthetics’ and the ‘politics of aesthetics’ mean” (Rancière 2009 a, 59). And this is what Rancière calls aesthetic efficacy.

At the heart of artistic practice lies the “tension between two statuses of artistic practice: as a means for producing an effect and as the reality of that effect.” The two aesthetic separations taken a look at earlier (work and its destination, art and its reliance on a distribution of the sensible) manifest in aesthetic efficacy. This effect is the break of the link between cause and effect. (Rancière 2009 a, 59, 63, 69.)

All of this results in that “[t]he very same thing that makes the aesthetic ‘political’ stands in the way of all strategies for ‘politicizing art’. Rancière lashes out against “critical art” that he sees as assuming “the continuity of the representative cause-effect schema” but trying to appropriate the aesthetic break in it. This is done by assuming that certain artistic practices lead to political mobilization, artists raise awareness in the viewers with their own political aims in mind. But Rancière states that this idea of cause and effect is mistaken. That “[t]here’s no direct road from intellectual awareness to political action. What occurs instead is a shift from a given sensible world to another sensible world that defines different capacities and incapacities, different forms of tolerance and intolerance. What occurs are processes of dissociation.” These cannot be calculated and they can manifest everywhere, at any time. (Rancière 2009 a, 74–75.)

Rancière also describes a mistaken way of working around the pitfall of critical art. Sometimes the failure of critical art is taken to testify the uselessness of mediation between the work and the future political action. By mediation I mean the art work raising awareness, being the mediator between the separation and the being together, as the work being the separation and the coming political activity the being together. Rancière sees that from this, some artists have gotten the idea that they can attain the goal of the coming community by making the work into that community. This comes down to the work being the

“direct anticipation of ‘being together’ in ‘being apart’. (Rancière 2009 a, 76–78.) But seeing the future community actualize in a participatory art work inside a white cube, is no witnessing the process of politics.

In the interview given for the English translation of *Politics of Aesthetics*, Rancière has elaborated on how “there is no criterion for establishing an appropriate correlation between the politics of aesthetics and the aesthetics of politics.” An example that Rancière explores in this context is the film *The Deer Hunter* as an example of the American films of the 70s and 80s that treated the war in Vietnam. Rancière sees that in this film, “the war scenes are essentially scenes of Russian roulette.” According to Rancière there are two ways to see this. The film could be viewed as proclaiming the “derisory nature of war” but at the same time, the inverse can be stated just as well. The film can be seen to pass judgement on the protests against the war. (Rancière 2004, 61–62.)

The aesthetic effect has political effect as long in the sense it raises a conflict about the distribution of the sensible. It cannot be used to frame a collective body as the work of art. Nor is it just a statement about the distribution as what should be changed. The aesthetic effect is “a multiplication of connections and disconnections that reframe the relation between bodies, the world they live in and the way in which they are ‘equipped’ to adapt to it. It is a multiplicity of folds and gaps in the fabric of common experience that change the cartography of the perceptible, the thinkable and the feasible. As such, it allows for new modes of political construction of common objects and new possibilities of collective enunciation.” But all of this happens under the assumption of the aesthetic effect: the dis-identification cannot be calculated. (Rancière 2009 a, 72–73.)

So artistic practices “can open up new passages towards new forms of political subjectivation.” For this to be successful, it needs to be acknowledged that there’s an “aesthetic cut that separates outcomes from intentions and preclude any direct path toward an ‘other side’ of words and images.” (Rancière 2009 a, 82.)

Rancière suggests as some kind of guideline for making art that side-steps the two strategies that don’t admit to the aesthetic cut: “constructing the work as the very tension between the apart and the together. This is true of works that try to explore the tension between the two terms, either by questioning the ways in which the community is tentatively produced or by exploring the potential of community entailed in separation itself.” (Rancière 2009 a, 78.)

In Rancière’s thinking we find a strong intertwining of aesthetics and

politics. What's more straightforward is the aesthetic side of politics. According to Rancière, "the question of the relationship between aesthetics and politics be raised at this level, the level of the sensible delimitation of what is common to the community, the forms of its visibility and of its organization." (Rancière 2004, 18.) And this is what can be understood through the concept of the distribution of the sensible.

The relationship between artistic practices and politics is a more difficult issue. Aesthetic equality is not political equality and there's always the danger of replacing the political equality by the aesthetic one. The aesthetic regime of art is tied to a change in the distribution of the sensible, and as such, has political implications.

But the aesthetic efficacy, which underlies art's political potential is also something that denies it. When the aesthetic (and art in the aesthetic regime) lend a hand to politics, it's through dissensus and as such, can never be calculated or manipulated in advance without becoming something else.

6. Polemics: Encounter with jagodzinski

In this chapter I orchestrate a dialogue between existing art education theorization and my reading of Rancière exposed in the previous chapters. As I used Rancièrian theory to rethink how politics and emancipation can be conceptualized, now I want to see what's missing, what's left unwritten and what's beyond my reading of Rancière. In a way, I want to stage a clash between my reading of Rancière and the work of art education theorist jan jagodzinski.

The choice of jan jagodzinski is a more or less a subjective one. In my opinion, jagodzinski's practice of theory is well-founded and sound, and I share his interest in a philosophical approach. What's more, I find his political investments to my personal liking. jagodzinski has engaged with highly philosophical art education theorization for decades. In recent years, he has turned to the work of Deleuze and Guattari, as well as Alain Badiou's philosophy, while still holding out to some key insights from a period invested heavily with psychoanalytic theory. Similar theoretical frameworks are somewhat popular in Anglo-American theoretical and philosophical discussions of art education⁶. This means that it's possible to view this engagement with jagodzinski as ex-

6 For example, British art education theorist, Dennis Atkinson has written utilizing the work of Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari as well as Badiou (see e.g. Atkinson 2012), Canadian Jason Wallin has worked from a Deleuzo-Guattarian framework (e.g. Wallin 2012), as has also Charles Garoian (e.g. Garoian 2014).

emphasing the possibilities⁷ of Rancièrian theorization in the context of art education. In the context of this study, this encounter also helps to reorient my inquiry.

jagodzinski draws heavily on contemporary art examples and discussions. Even though Rancière also discusses recent art works and debates (especially in Rancière 2009 a), jagodzinski's approach of almost exclusively drawing from recent developments is unlike Rancière's approach. It should be kept in mind that jagodzinski participates mainly in Anglo-American art education discussions. Because the theoretical framework differs greatly, I hope that the encounter will be fruitful.

In what follows, I'll focus on two articles by jagodzinski: *Postmetaphysical Vision: Art Education's Challenge In an Age of Globalized Aesthetics (A Mondofesto)* (2008) and *Beyond Aesthetics: Returning Force and Truth to Art and Its Education* (2009). The first article examines contemporary challenges for art education and utilizing a manifest-like exposition argues for a new theoretical foundation of art and its education. The latter examines the problem of representation and utilizes key concepts especially from Alain Badiou's philosophy. These two pieces seem to be complementary to a certain limit. More importantly, these two writings offer good concepts for challenging what I've previously discussed in this work. Also, some of the key aspects of jagodzinski's work seem to remain similar in later works—as the analysis of designer capitalism and the critique of new technology (in jagodzinski 2015) and the emphasis on contemporary art evident in e.g. when reading the Occupy movement's strategies through the lens of artistic practices (in jagodzinski 2013).

jagodzinski develops further the Deleuzian notion of society of control, introduced briefly in *Postscript on the Societies of Control* (1992), naming it “designer capitalism.” For jagodzinski, our contemporary reality is invested with an “illusionary freedom.” Our movements are not restricted as long as we have the right signifiers, such as a passport of a satisfying country or enough money on our bank account. Sites of consumption present themselves as playgrounds of freedom and as we stroll through them, designer capitalism continually tracks our habits, all the time redesigning its structures to increase monetary gains. (jagodzinski 2008, 147–149.) New developments, like the gathering and the analysis of big data, are used for the same purposes—to better the mechanisms of marketing to increase profits (jagodzinski 2015, 289). This society is described as a circuit of power by jagodzinski:

7 Exemplary, not conclusive since further research needs to be done to evaluate this more thoroughly.

micro-power is “ubiquitous throughout control societies” (jagodzinski 2008, 148).

Rancière doesn't provide such a detailed analysis of society. What might be seen as coming closest to a social critique is the discussion of consensus—developed in more detail at the end of *Disagreement*. In the contemporary context, Rancière refers to consensus when he describes how politics is denied by contemporary political elites as neo-liberal austerity politics are enforced globally. (Rancière 1999, 95–140.) But here the difference between Rancière's consensus and jagodzinski's designer capitalism is not its content but its object. Consensus is a way of structuring governance—it is a way of denying politics and substituting it with the police. Designer capitalism should not be viewed as an alternative, but instead as complementary to the concept of consensus. The analysis of the circuits of power in designer capitalism should be seen as describing a certain distribution of the sensible; this is the police as we have come to know it in our daily lives.

Relations of power don't play as big a role in Rancière's work as in jagodzinski's analysis. For Rancière, politics is not a relation of power or a struggle for power. There are different sites invested with relations of power throughout society (Rancière 2009 b, 118). For example, we can find a housewife subjugated by a husband, which clearly counts as a relation of power. But according to Rancière, this doesn't itself make the particular scene political. If the particular allocation of parts is put to question through dis-identification on the part of the dominated, we have a process of politics unfolding. (Rancière 1999, 32–33.) This is the reason Rancière hasn't analyzed power in depth: it's not a defining factor for the process of politics. As such, a relation of power doesn't provide more than a possible starting point for the process of politics. However, a conception of Rancièrian aesthetic education could be enriched by the inclusion of power to its theoretical repertoire.

But what could be thought of as emancipation in jagodzinski's thinking? I think that it would mean an escape from designer capitalism. An escape beyond the control; somewhere outside of the power circuit. (jagodzinski 2009, 340.) So the change jagodzinski argues for is directed at the field of art education: there's a need to change the ways of teaching (and making) art. And the reason is the struggle against designer capitalism. In jagodzinski's picture, it seems that the struggle can be won and a place (or abyss) of freedom lies as the desired end state.

Rancière's analysis of emancipation is different. Rancièrian emancipation is equality verifying action. jagodzinski seems to hold emanci-

pation as the goal to be attained by certain kinds of actions. This means that to follow my interpretation means that jagodzinski adheres to a modern conception of emancipation at least in the sense that emancipation is emancipation from somewhere. Also, this state that is striven towards is designated as a state of freedom. Nevertheless, jagodzinski doesn't refer to what he proposes as emancipation, so this interpretation needs to be taken with a grain of salt.

At first sight, it seems that jagodzinski's proposal is very totalizing. jagodzinski seems to argue that all new technologies necessarily contribute to designer capitalism. The only thing that seems to step out of its clutches is "some art" because "its social transformative potential is not lost given the contemporary socio-historical context of designer capitalism" (jagodzinski 2009, 339, emphasis original). I will return to the role of art in jagodzinski's work later, but from this we could make the conclusion that art has the potential of being or moving something outside of designer capitalism. This would mean that social change pursued would be a relocation of social reality beyond capitalism, or possibly an overturning of capitalism—a revolution.

The change in Rancièrian context is a redistribution of the sensible. The idea of change evident in a redistribution is not as radical or totalizing as for example in the case of a revolution. The redistribution doesn't bring about anything new: it reorganizes in the relational and spatial sense the partitions allocated in the original distribution. In this sense, it's not so much a revolution as a modification of what was prior. Nothing is moved outside of the initial state, but the state itself is altered. But in the sense of collective emancipation, the result would be a new distribution which bears the traces of and inscriptions of equality introduced by the process of politics.

But to subscribe such a totalizing reading to jagodzinski, wouldn't do justice to his work. Just to cite one problem for an interpretation like the one above, is jagodzinski's acclaim of the work of Michael Moore's "docu-fictions". According to jagodzinski, these "beat capital and the state at its own game" by revealing some truth through "the powers of the false." (jagodzinski 2008, 158.) So in this case, economically successful culture products, undoubtedly part of designer capitalism in one way or another, have potential for change. Thus the question cannot be simply about what's inside or outside of designer capitalist spaces or practices.

Before turning to jagodzinski's more exact proposals concerning art and its education, let me make a further remark about the general change proposed. The struggle for the change is not supposed to run

against designer capitalism straight but it “confronts the ‘society of control’ anamorphically, in an oblique way and not head on” (jagodzinski 2009, 341, emphasis in original). jagodzinski articulates this as a step away from other articulations of politics. The struggle against capitalism has to be anamorphic to escape the problem of representation.

In jagodzinski’s arguments, representations take a key-role. He sees that “[u]nder designer capitalism the liquid self is potentially no longer branded by color, gender, sex-orientation, moral judgment, class and so on, but through market labels and customer loyalty.” jagodzinski seems to equate identities with representations. What’s more, these are what designer capitalism thrives on. The emerging identities only provide new representations, which are appropriated by the system; they, for example, enable more refined marketing strategies. (jagodzinski 2008, 148–149, emphasis in original.)

The equivalency of identity and representation comes from psychoanalysis. In Lacanian theory, the ego is always something illusionary. Of the three Lacanian psychic registers of the Imaginary, Symbolic and Real, the latter interests jagodzinski the most. In jagodzinski’s writings, the Symbolic and Imaginary are somehow associated with falseness, illusion and control, whereas the Real promises an “abyss of freedom”. Identities are construed in imaginary terms, and linguistic representations also play a role in this. But it’s the Real, as the register that’s paradoxically nowhere and everywhere that breaks the neatly rational misrecognition of the Ego. This psychoanalytic insight is what fuels jagodzinski’s opposition to the over-emphasis of cognition in the field of art education and his opposition to representations in general. (jagodzinski 2008, 152–156.)

Combining the concept of the Real with a Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of the virtual, jagodzinski argues for recognition of the virtual Real in art and its education. This is not just to create an ethical approach. According to jagodzinski, this is the only way to escape designer capitalism. (jagodzinski 2009, 345.) Identity politics play out according to the Ego, which results only in new representations and become appropriated to the system.

In the Rancièrian picture, we find a different critique of representational identities. For Rancièrè, an identification is always a partition in the social prescribed by the distribution of the sensible. This means that subjectivation has to happen through a dis-identification. In a reciprocal move, the social place prescribed by the distribution of the sensible is contested and a new space opened for the people to take stage, altering the social whole. In the end we get a redistribution of the

sensible. So there are parallels between Rancière's subjectivation as a dis-identification and jagodzinski's critique of representational identity politics. For jagodzinski, an identity is something that's false and it cannot provide a starting point for struggles against designer capitalism. For Rancière, the key is also not subscribing to a certain identity, but to contest the given ones.

jagodzinski views visual culture pedagogy in a negative light. The new technologies seem to only further the conquest of designer capitalism. Video games express the same illusory freedom evident in designer capitalism's reality, where "blogs and myspace.com are often narcissistic rants." (jagodzinski 2008, 148–151.) But if visual culture pedagogy cannot overcome the obstacles, what's jagodzinski's proposal?

According to jagodzinski, art and its education should strive to go beyond the realm of representation. jagodzinski develops his argument with reference to artistic examples from contemporary artists. For art to escape the clutches of designer capitalism, an artist "can maneuver the gaps, utilize the waste, become trash, refuse to participate, and hack the passwords at the boundaries to reach into the abyss of freedom." This results in art that acts "as an affective becoming or force." (jagodzinski 2008, 152–153.) In this way, art has to strive away from being reduced to a sign or a representation exploitable by designer capitalism.

jagodzinski sets two conditions for this: "a relocation of the aesthetic from its hegemonic location as a (prosthetic) eye in designer capitalism to the body, and (2) a disbursal or decentering of the commodified art object into the processes of becoming that take into account the technological specificity of recording and playback." (jagodzinski 2008, 154.) So art works capable of inciting change work in a different modality than the one trapped by designer capitalism. In addition, art works should escape becoming commodities by becoming events. The result: "[t]he process of art and its education of affective becoming open up new worlds of experiential possibility." Art gains an ability to disrupt the "the habitualized self of desire" (jagodzinski 2008, 153–154).

This has some similarities with Rancièorean theorization, where art provides a starting point for dissensus and the playing out of politics. Even though the conditions set forth by jagodzinski are more exact than we can find in Rancière's writings. There seems to be a similar disruption of the order, a conflict introduced to expose the contingency of the police, to put the distribution of the sensible into question.

But there is one main difference. Whereas Rancière warns against the metapolitical danger, replacing politics with something else (like the aesthetic), jagodzinski could be read as doing just this. The escape from designer capitalism happens through the promise of some art. In this way we get a picture, where the virtual Real is somehow recognized or caught through art, and it completes the picture: the utopian abyss of freedom is attained. This means disregarding the fundamental polemical nature of human being together.

What demarcates Rancièrian theorization maybe most significantly is its insistence on an egalitarian method and a topographical analysis. jagodzinski seems to position himself as an intellectual that prescribes a way forward. This creates a hierarchical formation much like in a case of the traditional schoolmaster: the master explicator. At the end of the *mondo festo* jagodzinski restates the theory he has mapped and calls his text a “foundation” for a new art and its education (jagodzinski 2008, 159). This is something Rancière has avoided. For example, in the case of his political writings he has not aimed at providing “a theory of politics, setting the principles for political practice” (Rancière 2009 b, 120, emphasis original). So Rancièrian theorization should be antifoundational in the sense of steering away from setting up foundations or sets of principles which prescribe what needs to be done.

To close this chapter, I want to highlight what I learned from this encounter with jagodzinski.

First, there seems to be a certain inadequacy evident in Rancièrian theorization when it comes to the individual or particular subject. The distribution of the sensible, seems to be inadequate when it comes to an analysis the situation of a particular subject. The distribution is something that organizes particulars in relation to the whole and Rancière’s portrayal of politics shows that the count is not all that there is—the police is challenged by those not accounted by it. But nonetheless, this picture doesn’t describe the situation of the subject in the local context. What kind of a situation is the acceptance of the role prescribed by the distribution? Why does a subject take up the position? This affective level⁸ of the subject seems to be missing from Rancière’s work.

jagodzinski’s analysis of designer capitalism and the notion of the virtual Real do seem to provide a more adequate starting point for unrav-

8 Juuso Tervo also mentions in his doctoral dissertation (which I will examine a bit more in the next chapter), that Rancière’s theoretical work lacks “the affective level of politics”, which we can find in e.g. Deleuzo-Guattarian theorization (Tervo 2014, 294).

eling these intricacies. However, Rancière has expressed an opposition to the hierarchical theoretical analysis of the unconscious as something unknown and unknowable to the subject. Because of the subterranean form of psychoanalytic analysis, a position of mastery would seem to follow. This applies especially to the notion of the virtual Real, since its connection to Lacanian theorization is explicit. But we can see a problem of the same form just as well in designer capitalism as social critique: it seems that jagodzinski argues that the consumers in designer capitalism really don't know how they are controlled and this is part of the continuity of the system. But the issue is more nuanced than can be explored in detail here⁹.

Second, jagodzinski's analysis of designer capitalism raises questions about the very abstract nature of Rancière's social theorization. The analysis of consensus provides a powerful critique of the form of governance but does it really describe our life in contemporary capitalism? In many aspects the power circuits of control deliver a more detailed and satisfactory analysis of our situation. For example, the mechanisms of control in our socio-historical context have developed such accuracy through digital technology, analysis of big data and so on, that they increasingly penetrate our lives. If we take this control and think of it as a form of governance: is it really guided by similar principles as in the Greek polis of the Antiquity?

Third, we can see from this encounter that the way we conceptualize change is of paramount importance. In jagodzinski, we see a picture that's close to totalization in regard to this question. Everything is in the danger of being assumed under designer capitalism with little room for resistance. New technologies only contribute to more effective capitalistic exploitation or control. The role of some art becomes that of a savior: the only way to the abyss of freedom. Rancièrean conceptualization of change as the redistribution of the sensible tries to resist this danger: nothing lies outside and nothing comes to the rescue: there's

9 For example, the relationship in psychoanalytic theory between the "emancipator" and the one being "emancipated" should be interrogated in more depth. In my opinion, we're unlikely to find the same formal relationship as evident in e.g. Marxism. If the Real is the register that introduces a gap into the Symbolic-Imaginary, then it's something common to all the subjects, without a subject position beyond it. In this respect, Rancière's critique of the unconsciousness, as the beginning of an analysis necessarily hierarchical, seems too hasty: the possibility for a master position seems impossible. Knowledge, because its position as the end result of analysis, is also something that should be analysed in more detail to be able to examine the difference more fully.

only the sensible and its reconfiguration. What has changed, are the inscriptions of equality evident in the new distribution.

7. Rancièorean Aesthetic Education

Before turning to elaborate on my proposal for Rancièorean aesthetic education, I'll shortly introduce some of the writing¹⁰ in the area of art and education that has utilized Rancière's writings from a perspective similar to mine. Besides brief mentions (like that found in jagodzinski 2013, 22–23), some writers have taken up key concepts from Rancière to further develop or complement their own ideas¹¹. For example, art education theorist Dennis Atkinson has used Rancièorean theorization to add to his theoretical framework, which draws more heavily from Alain Badiou, Lacanian psychoanalysis and Deleuze-Guattarian theory¹². Others have set forth to enlarge Rancièorean theorization—like Kurt Thumlert in his article *Affordances of Equality: Ranciere, Emerg-*

10 The art education discourses I am referring to below are mainly Anglo-American. This is a subjective choice to limit the discussions I'll try to cover, also necessitated in part by linguistic competencies. Rancière has also been used in the Finnish context, but not, to my knowledge, from a perspective directly related to this study.

11 Like Educational theorist Jane McDonnell who has utilized Rancière's writings on politics and aesthetics, alongside Chantal Mouffe's and Gert Biesta's work, to take part in the British discussions on the role of art in relation to education of "democratic citizenship" (in McDonnell 2012).

12 See especially the exposition of Atkinson's theoretical framework in the second chapter of Atkinson *Art, Equality and Learning. Pedagogies Against the State* (2011).

ing Media, and the New Amateur (2014), to which I will return in the Conclusions–chapter.

Harder to capture in brief is the utilization of Rancièrian theorization found in my supervisor’s, Juuso Tervo’s, doctoral dissertation. The study interrogates the question “what does it mean to act politically” in the context of art education theorization (Tervo 2014, 6). The key concept of “subjectification”¹³, defined for the context of the study as “a constitution of subjectivity that has a social/societal agency”, provides the “entryway to the strategies of politicization in art education” (Tervo 2014, 17). The theoretical framework for this interrogation of the political in art education is formed by a reading of Rancière’s writings as a “radical politics of actualization.” The framework includes a reading of Giorgio Agamben’s political philosophy as a “radical politics of potentiality.” (Tervo 2014, 12.) Tervo engages with different art education discussions, mainly from the Anglo-American context, in order interrogate conceptualizations of art education’s politics. The goal of this critique is “to propose an ontological shift in a political imagination” (Tervo 2014, ii). The goal of re-conceptualizing the politics of art education is also similar to the underlying motivations for my thesis.

This brief survey shows that Rancièrian theorization has been found useful in the field of art education theorization before. But what about my perspective? Is there research on art and education that use Rancière’s writings in the context of aesthetic education or something similar?

From what I am aware of, the engagement of educational philosopher Tyson E. Lewis, comes closest to what I’ve been interested in¹⁴. Rancière’s work is examined in great detail in his book *The Aesthetics of Education. Theatre, Curiosity, and Politics in the work of Jacques Rancière and Paulo Freire*¹⁵, where he orchestrates an in-depth en-

13 I have opted to use the term *subjectivation* in this study but here keep to Tervo’s choice of term.

14 A writer who has drawn from Rancière’s writings and applied the notion of aesthetic is Arne De Boever. He presents an interpretation of Rancière’s writings on method and coins a dichotomy of approaches: the logic of representation and presentation. Utilizing the latter is seen as opening up a “scene of aesthetic education.” (De Boever 2012, 70, 79-80.) I find De Boever’s interpretation, without going to detail, differing from my own and therefore won’t explore his position further.

15 Lewis has also written an article that’s partly based on the book (Lewis 2013). The novel import is the examination of the three different cases where “contemporary crises in art are mirrored in contemporary theories and practices of education.” All

counter between the work of Rancière and the seminal figure of pedagogy of the oppressed, Paulo Freire.

There are many converge points between my reading of Rancière's writings presented in chapters 2–5 and Lewis's interpretation in *The Aesthetics of Education*—so many that I don't have the space to note all of them here. The aesthetics of education are examined through a similar reading of Rancière's project with an emphasis on the interconnectedness of the political and the aesthetic. The book points to aspects of Rancière's project which have remained unarticulated—like the lack of treatment of freedom¹⁶, evident especially in discussions on emancipation. What I find most interesting in Lewis approach, is the way he is able to extend Rancièrian theorization. For instance, from an examination of Rancière's writings on Louis Althusser¹⁷, Lewis is able to extend the concept of stultification. He argues that “stultification is far from a monolithic practice (as Rancière often describes it), and instead is a complex set of processes that produce a variety of possible effects” (Lewis 2014, 31). In other instances, Lewis is also able to take Rancière's writings further¹⁸. This happens for example in the way he develops Rancière's central political metaphor of theatre. He goes on to extract different aspects of this metaphor: “the space of the stage, the time of interruption, the performance of the “as if...” and finally the spontaneity and improvisation of the script.” (Lewis 2014, 39–40.) This further explores Rancière's fundamental thesis of the aesthetics of politics, elaborating the capabilities of taking the political metaphor

these proposals “betray the promise of sensorial redistribution that forms the heart of Rancière's theory of democratic dissensus.” Lewis summarises this: “the aesthetic promise of dissensus is broken when the ambiguities of atopia transform into relational proximity, “lifelong” colonization/overdetermination, or institutionalized hierarchies.” (Lewis 2013, 53–61, 66.)

16 Lewis argues that there's are fundamentally Kantian aspects to the notion of freedom we can construct from Rancière's writings (Lewis 2014, 73–82).

17 Althusser was Rancière's teacher. Later, the student broke away from Althusserian Marxism to formulate his own work.

18 In Lewis more recent article, “*Move Around! There is Something to See Here*”: *The Biopolitics of the Perceptual Pedagogy of the Arts* (2015), he sets out to go beyond Rancière's writings using concepts from other theoreticians. The Rancièrian concepts of the aesthetic regime of art, pensiveness and police are mainly utilized and a “pedagogical model of the aesthetic regime of the arts” is put forth, extending Rancièrian theorization to explore biopolitics. (Lewis 2015, 53–60.)

seriously.

In what follows, I intend to use what ideas I've myself gathered from my encounter with Rancière's writing and use them—put them to action in the field of art education. I utilize notions that Rancière has used in different kinds of contexts and apply them to sketch out an idea of aesthetic education. This means that I draw e.g. from discussions of art works and explore how they could be used in the context of aesthetic education¹⁹. So my aim is not to lay a foundation using the work of Rancière. It just happens that my theoretical journey has wandered through his oeuvre and the insights and their interconnections come from his work. This is why I have chosen to label my proposal Rancièrian aesthetic education. As an entry point to my conceptualization, I want to briefly note Rancière's discussion of Schiller's idea of aesthetic education.

Rancière asserts that Schiller responded to the failure of the French Revolution by elaborating his conception of aesthetic education. According to Rancière, the goal glimmering in Schiller's mind was that of "a revolution transforming not only the forms of the State but the forms of sensory life" (Rancière 2011, 12). This would result in "a freedom and an equality that are sensible realities and not simply legal and governmental formulas." This would be a truly Aesthetic Revolution. (Rancière 2009 b, 122.) This forms the radical promise of Schillerian aesthetic education. The goal is to transform the being together of humans, the sensible reality, into a more egalitarian one. This is supposed to escape the dead-ends of political change through revolution.

But there's a metapolitical danger in all of this, which was already touched upon in the last chapter: substituting politics with something else. The aesthetic could be seen as taking the place of politics²⁰. This would mean refusing the foundational dispute of politics. But Rancière also acknowledges that the aesthetic metapolitics "continuously inter-

19 There's an important point to acknowledge here. Careless application of concepts across phenomena, topics and disciplines sometimes creates problems, like the metapolitical danger of substituting politics with something else. I'll return to the point about metapolitics below and in general, I'll aim to use concepts in appropriate connections.

20 An extreme example of this can be found from the Soviet Revolution. Interrogation of this historical point in more detail is beyond the scope of this thesis, but Rancière sees that "the program of the aesthetic Revolution in which art suppresses itself in creating no longer works of art but forms of life, was inextricably interwoven with the construction of the Soviet Revolution" (Rancière 2009 b, 122).

feres in politics and contributes to weaving the fabric of the political, its words, images, attitudes, forms of sensibility, etc...” (Rancière 2009 b, 122.)

So to begin my proposal for what Rancièrian aesthetic education could be, the process of politics has to be recognized as what it is—and not put under threat of being substituted by something else. If we think about the practice of consensus, what it tries is to deny politics, to only assert that there are e.g. economical laws that prescribe what needs to be done and only a scientific elite knows how to govern the social body. This is parallel to a situation in which art is seen as promising an egalitarian future and artists come to present their works that directly fashion the coming social body. This also replaces the fundamentally polemical and antagonistic nature of politics with a utopian aesthetic equality.

Recognizing politics as what it is leads to think of the social from a new perspective. It is the antagonistic or polemical relationship outlining all human being together. From recognizing the aesthetics of politics, we can locate this social in the fabric of the sensible in continual movement that facilitates our being-together, the distribution of the sensible. This can be thought of the stage²¹ of Rancièrian aesthetic education: the relations between the participants become a sensible reality to all. This escapes seeing the stage only as a network of relations of power, but instead as a fluxuating landscape of shifting positions and roles. This means that the roles of teacher and student still exist—there’s the possibility of the emergence of the ignorant master—but these roles cannot be fixed. So there is a possibility of experimentation in spatio-temporal fabric.

The politics of aesthetics creates an important restriction for Rancièrian aesthetic education. The aesthetic can lend to the process of politics two things: the possibility of redistribution of the sensible through a work of art and the possibility for opening up dissensus. The works of art in the aesthetic regime directly alter the distribution of the sensible, pointing to aesthetic equality (e.g. break of the hierarchy in aesthetic form). But this doesn’t happen through a proper subjectivation and doesn’t count as a process of politics. Nevertheless, it can leave its own important marks on the distribution of the sensible. In some cases, aesthetics works can open up a space for dissensus, which may lead to the playing out of politics. Recognizing these limits means acknowledging the threat of the metapolitical in the case of aesthetic

21 In exploring the Rancièrian theatrical metaphor for politics in my proposal for aesthetic education, I am indebted to Lewis’s work (especially Lewis 2014, 39–55).

education. Art works work to reconfigure the stage of the sensible.

Seeing the event of aesthetic education as a creation of a community is useful. In a discussion of communities provoked by works of art, Rancière introduced the notion of a community of sense. Because an art work can be viewed as a configuration of sense, an event of aesthetic education can also be viewed as a community of sense. What makes this kind of community interesting in connection to aesthetic education is its form as a dissensual figure. This means that they are open spaces for dissensus, providing a possible beginning point for the process of politics. A dissensual community is being-together in being-apart—thus revealing the fundamental tension underlying all communities. As such, these communities are in continual shift and so are the communities born out of the being-together in aesthetic education.

The aesthetic cut is something that the project of Rancièrian aesthetic education has to acknowledge. According to Rancière, there's no direct route from aesthetic effect to political action. This could be read as another statement of the limitation of the politics of aesthetics, but here it is used to different function. Through it, Rancièrian aesthetic education becomes radically antiteleological. This is necessary, because there's simply no way to calculate the effects, no direct lines to follow. The aesthetic education is only a staging of the its own eventness, nothing more—it cannot flag a way for its participants to follow.

What about change in Rancièrian aesthetic education? The process of politics might happen or might not happen on the stage of aesthetic education. If it happens, it will reconfigure the sensible reality, the distribution of the sensible. This means the playing out of the process of politics, and it creates inscriptions of equality in the distribution of the sensible. This notion of change escapes totalization in that the reconfiguration is always something that happens in our already existing sensible reality. In the space and time perceptible to us—it doesn't become some aim in the distant future.

This picture of Rancièrian aesthetic education points to action that verifies equality. These events open up possibilities for acknowledging the capabilities of each and every: the Rancièrian meaning of emancipation.

To recapitulate, the politics of aesthetics and the aesthetics of politics should be acknowledged. This brings about the acceptance of the polemical nature of human being-together. The aesthetic doesn't play out the process of politics, but instead becomes the stage of Rancièrian aesthetic education. But there's a further result of avoiding the metapo-

litical danger: the aesthetic provides possibilities for reconfiguring the sensible fabric of our social reality. Accepting the aesthetic cut makes Rancièrian aesthetic education antiteleological. This means that the emancipatory potential of education is accepted and the project doesn't itself become the goal, but the playing out of politics, our interactions in the common sensible reality, gain their importance.

I think this proposal is able to combine some key insights of Rancièr's philosophy in a conceptualization of education. The understanding of the aesthetic nature of politics is facilitated without falling into the trap of metapolitics. Elaborating on the sensible fabric of being-together sheds light on not just the tension underlying it but also provides ways to engage with it. And also, the Rancièrian project of rethinking emancipation is utilized: collective emancipation as the verification of equality is also considered.

The conceptualization of social and change open up ways to think of new ways of struggling against suffocating conditions in our contemporary world. For example, in Jagodzinski's designer capitalism, it is only a leap outside facilitated by some art, that enables change. As a reconfiguration of the sensible, the change is something that happens in the sensible fabric of our reality. As the inscriptions of equality are carved to this fabric, something happens but it's not a revolution. In terms of struggle, this facilitates thinking anew the ways of resistance.

Rancièr's understanding of the aesthetic and its possibilities in connection with art is not seen as something that magically rescues education or the social from inequality or from the grasp of capitalism's control. Aesthetic art works have a role in the project of emancipation as enabling reconfiguring the sensible and opening up dissensus. Nothing more, nothing less.

Before turning to the limits of my account, it should be noted that this exposition of Rancièrian aesthetic education is works as a philosophical interrogation of the ways of conceptualizing the relations between art, education and politics—it cannot be evaluated as providing guidelines directly applicable in art classrooms. It is also limited in its power of being applied to concrete questions of art making practice, art education practices and curriculum design.

In Tervo's dissertation, we find the need to augment Rancièrian conception of subjectivation with Agamben's take on it—to interrogate how Rancièr's process of subjectivation through dis-identification is always an act: something that needs to actualize. Thus there's no room for the actualization not to take place. This is complemented in the treatment of Agamben's "whateverness", his conception of sub-

jectivation. (Tervo 2014, 12.) Thus Rancière's focus on action is also a restriction since it seems to prescribe subjectivation as a certain kind of state—action. In Tervo's work we see that the possibilities opened by not actualizing but remaining potential are just as interesting and radical. My proposal for Rancièrian aesthetic education is also unable to capture treat this potentiality.

Tervo also find something missing from the coupling of the two theorizations. Through a reading of Finnish performance artist Pilvi Takala's art work, *The Trainee*, a temporal aspect is touched upon. This move is needed in order to enlarge theorization "to the very taking place of learning qua a political act, which allowed me to discuss political subjectification as an event that has a precarious duration." (Tervo 2014, 291–292.) This is also an evident lack in my conceptualization of Rancièrian aesthetic education.

Lewis finds several things either unarticulated or undertheorised in Rancière's work. Most importantly Lewis notes that Rancière's rethinking of emancipation doesn't mention freedom, but relies entirely on equality. Lewis uncovers the connection to Kantian formulations of freedom and attributes them to him. (Lewis 2014, 73–82.) A concept of emancipation that doesn't refer to freedom seems problematic at first, and in the context of aesthetic education with an emphasis on equality verifying action, the tensions between freedom and equality, should be conceptualized.

Kurt Thumlert sets out to enlarge Rancièrian theorization and he finds connections between the new amateurs and the universal teaching of Jacotot-Rancière. In Thumlert's reading of Jacotot's pedagogic adventures, "novice learners [were permitted] to improvisationally engage the same resources and technologies, and to experimentally do the same things as "the master"." In this way, the learners enact dis-identification through "acts that demonstrate equality." An affordance of equality is for Thumlert "any media form or technology that supports [...] improvisation by anyone; the experimental enactment of common talents and artistic capacities that are, as such, the property of no one in particular, or of anyone at all." (Thumlert 2015, 118, 121.)

Thumlert's article shows the possibility of putting Rancièrian theory into practice by locating problematics within art education contexts. In the conclusion-section of the paper, Thumlert considers "how formal spaces of learning might be made porous to these affordances of equality and the forms of agency they support." So the goal is not to investigate how new technologies could be used in the context of schooling but instead, see how they can "disrupt our most stultifying educational

conventions.” (Thumlert 2015, 123.) Thumlert’s article is a great example of putting Rancière’s ideas to work and this brings out a fundamental restriction of my philosophical approach: practice remains somewhere unattainable.

To summarize, I locate the following things undertheorized or entirely lacking in Rancière’s writing and which remain inadequately treated in my proposal for Rancièrian aesthetic education. The questions of potentiality, and actualization: how should Rancièrian theorization encounter its own imperative of action? The question of freedom and especially what it means in relation to equality? And last but not least: what is the relation Rancièrian theorization could have with action? How could a conceptualization of Rancièrian aesthetic education be put to work?

8. Conclusions

In an engagement with Rancière's writings on education, I have been able to rethink the concept of emancipation as equality verifying action. Through Rancière's writings on politics I have elaborated on the connections between aesthetics and politics, uncovering the aesthetic nature of politics and the way the aesthetic can have effects on the political. This enabled me to look at how to re-conceptualize art education's politics. I have presented my proposal for what Rancièrian aesthetic education could be and I argue that it provides a renewed understanding of emancipation, as well as the political, in the context of art education.

The key challenge for Rancièrian aesthetic education is to escape the danger of metapolitics: the politics of aesthetics and the aesthetics of politics should both be acknowledged. This is highlighted for example when we think about analogies in conceptualizations of contemporary art and pedagogical models, such as relational art and relational pedagogy (see Lewis 2013). Accepting this danger brings out the polemical nature of human being-together.

Art itself is not interesting for Rancièrian aesthetic education, but the aesthetic is—encompassing non-art and art alike. This is of course parallel to the developments of visual culture education, but here we reach the conclusion from a particular philosophical orientation. The aesthetic doesn't play out the process of politics, but instead becomes the stage of Rancièrian aesthetic education. The aesthetic also sets out the limits within which we can avoid the metapolitical danger: it can reconfigure the distribution of the sensible and open up possibilities for dissensus, nothing more.

Rancièrian aesthetic education remains antiteleological as a result of the aesthetic cut. There's no longer a correspondence between cause and effect, and the project of Rancièrian aesthetic education remains itself without a goal. This means that the emancipatory potential of education is accepted and the project doesn't itself become the goal, but the playing out of politics, our interactions in the common sensible reality, take central stage.

The things that need further theorization in this theoretical constellation are, first, questions of potentiality, and actualization. The emphasis on action creates a mobilizing imperative in Rancièrian theorization, that should be somehow resolved. A possible solution might be to theorize it as somehow remaining in suspension, like the tensional foundation of all communities.

Rancièrian notion of emancipation without reference to freedom should also be evaluated in more detail. If we leave out the concept of freedom, do we lose something? Could we find a conceptualization of freedom compatible with Rancièrè's notion of equality? What does it mean only to talk about verification of equality and not talk about freedom to act?

The most significant problem is methodological. Rancièrè has emphasized the role of action throughout his writings but what is the relation between Rancièrian theorization and practice? If theory comes first, do we necessarily have a position of mastery before us? This is a relevant worry for this thesis.

In my construction of this thesis, we can find a linear passage from gathering theoretical tools (my reading of Rancièrè), testing them out (as in the encounter with jagodzinski) to combining them to a theory (my proposal for Rancièrian aesthetic education). But to make such conclusions on the basis of form alone is too hasty. The linearity of passage assumes a conventional reading habit, which might not be the case in the usual case: a reader might just as well leaf through the source-listing and check the conclusions before even thinking about reading the whole thing from cover to cover. It's also arguable that to see reading a text as a continuous, linear passage from some initial stage to the end, is naive. The cognitive work is undoubtedly full of breaks and discontinuations. I think that a research report can be viewed like the *Télémaque*—what's important, is how and in what kind of a situation it is used. My proposal for Rancièrian aesthetic education should gain its significance in how it can be used.

But the real challenge is not the formal staging of this research report. It is how I just proposed use this thesis: as a theoretical constella-

tion that should be into practice. Is it enough that I state that it should not denote principles and lay out a foundation prescribing what needs to be done?

These are dangers Rancière has also faced and tried to avoid by his egalitarian method and topographical analysis. To recapitulate the ways that we have seen this method in action in this thesis, the first manifestation of this methodological position is to treat materials in an egalitarian manner. This came down to, for example, giving the same kind of attention to Plato's dialogues and passages extracted from workers' journals. The second manifestation is the topographical analysis. For example, the ignorance of the worker is not assumed, but instead he/she is listened to by taking seriously the enunciations in the worker's journal. This means that the subterranean is not uncovered through analysis of the real condition of the worker, from the unconscious or from somewhere else. Instead the topography of the given situation is revealed. It's opposite in this case might be a Marxist analysis, that would suppose the worker's ignorance from his true condition, in which the analysis reveals something that's otherwise hidden.

But in what ways do my research choices exemplify an egalitarian position? As a theoretical work with a philosophical approach, I think the possibilities of egalitarian method haven't been fully utilized in this thesis. But in the context of theorization, I think the positioning of my interpretation of Rancière has approximated this method. I steered away from an exegetical outlook, from trying to uncover what Rancière really said. Instead, I presented a topographical analysis mapping the landscape in preparation for my own proposal.

In my choice of materials, I tried to lower Rancière from the pedestal of the philosopher by orchestrating an encounter between Jagodzinski. Through this I was able to interrogate the limits of a Rancièrian position and the clash revealed some limits. Thus the Rancièrian framework was not just taken as given and conclusive. Instead this clash could even be viewed as a case of dissensus when disagreements about, for example, concepts of change (as a redistribution and a revolution) were revealed²².

In positioning my theorization, I avoided an exegetical outlook. This is why my research question was formulated as "what Rancièrian aesthetic education could be". Thus it was meant as non-conclusive and up for further development. Also this move resisted the work becoming that of the master prescribing what others should think and do, but to

22 It should be noted that this process does not count as the playing out of the process of politics.

present something to be used.

To shift the focus more generally to method: how does the idea of a topographical analysis connect to the notion of the aesthetic? The distribution of the sensible could be argued to also include theoretical works. This thesis includes configurations of sense just as the computer lab it has been typed in. This situates theoretical works and theoretical practice within the same sensory fabric as everything else, nothing beyond or above. Theorizations effect our faculties and modalities, practices and positions, just as the other sensible things around us.

And to view theoretical work as part of the sensible fabric means that it's also susceptible to reconfiguration. Maybe egalitarian method can be seen as making its own inscriptions of equality—maybe theoretical equality—into the distribution of the sensible?

But is this enough? I think that to truly explore the possibilities and limits of an egalitarian method would mean interrogating the limits of theorization itself. What can we find when we suspend the dichotomy of theory and practice? Could we develop theorization as action and action as theorization? When seeing theorization itself as part of the same sensible fabric, this becomes feasible in from the philosophical perspective. This would mean to explore Rancièrian aesthetic education as practice and theory: to interrogate the limits, connections, breaks and tensions in the sensible that it would be.

What are some other further possibilities of development for a conceptualization of Rancièrian aesthetic education? Mapping out its allies: what theorists could be aligned in this project? Tervo's dissertation (Tervo 2014) shows how Rancière can be coupled with a philosopher in many ways opposed to him in a fruitful way, without downplaying the tensions evident. By a move away from just focusing on Rancière, an aesthetic education could be enlarged. For example, the work of Alain Badiou might provide further tools to engage the event of aesthetic education possibly helping with issues of temporality. The affectual side of politics could be interrogated with a Deleuzo-Guattarian framework.

Since aesthetic education can be seen as encapsulating art education, the relations between art education theorization should be interrogated in more depth. A brief encounter with jagodzinski in this study has shown that an engagement of this kind can be highly encouraging. This should be understood as a possibility of new theoretical findings. Also, the fundamental problem in the relation between theory and practice could probably be best interrogated in this encounter. What better scene to engage action and theory of aesthetic education, than in the scene of art education?

Developing the egalitarian method of theorizing is another interesting aspect that should be taken another look at. What kind of breaks between divisions of disciplines could art education research facilitate? In what ways could Rancièrian theorization be enlarged by these, or vice-versa?

The significance of this master's thesis is in its attempt at rethinking central concepts of the critical tradition within art education theorization: emancipation and politics. Through Rancièrian rethinking of the aesthetic, this becomes situated in a deeply interconnected framework. All of this is connected to contemporary debates in Anglo-American art education discussions (as exemplified in the literature cited before in this study), but also to the Finnish discussions. For example, art educator and theorist Mira Kallio-Tavin has explored the notion of art education for social justice and the ways art teachers could act as activists (Kallio-Tavin 2015, 27–29). At the philosophical level of re-conceptualizing fundamental concepts such as politics and emancipation in the framework of aesthetic education, this thesis engages in its own way with similar questions about art and its education.

In connection to using the lesson of the Ignorant Schoolmaster Rancière noted that:

“Equality is fundamental and absent, timely and untimely, always up to the initiative of individuals and groups who, set against the ordinary course of events, take the risk of verifying their equality, of inventing individual and collective forms for its verification. Affirmation of these simple principles in fact constitutes an unprecedented dissonance, a dissonance one must, in a way, forget in order to continue improving schools, programs and pedagogies, but that one must also, from time to time, listen to again so that the act of teaching does not lose sight of the paradoxes that give it meaning.” (from Rancière 2010 b, 15–16.)

I am sure that the same applies to the lesson of Rancièrian aesthetic education.

9. Sources

Atkinson, D. 2011. *Art, Equality and Learning. Pedagogies Against the State*. Rotterdam, Sense Publishers.

Atkinson, D., 2012. Contemporary Art and Art in Education: The New, Emancipation and Truth. *ijADE* 31.1, pp. 5–18.

Bingham, C. and Biesta, G., 2010. *Jacques Rancière. Education, Truth, Emancipation*. London, Continuum.

De Broever, A. 2012. Scenes of Aesthetic Education: Rancière, Oedipus, and Notre Musique. *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, Vol. 46. No. 3, Fall 2012, pages 69–82.

Deleuze, G., 1992. Postscript on the Societies of Control. *October*, Vol. 59. (Winter, 1992), pp. 3–7.

Garoian, C., 2014. In the Event That Art and Teaching Encounter. *Studies in Art Education* 56(1), pages 384–396.

jagodzinski, j., 2008. Postmetaphysical Vision: Art Education's Challenge In an Age of Globalized Aesthetics (A Mondofesto). *Studies in Art Education* 49(2), pages 147–160.

jagodzinski, j., 2009. Beyond Aesthetics: Returning Force and Truth to Art and Its Education (2009). *Studies in Art Education*; Summer 2009, 50(4), pages 338–351.

jagodzinski, j., 2013. Anonymous: The Occupy Movement and the Failure of Representational Democracy. *The Journal of Social Theory*

in *Art Education* (33), pages 21–37.

jagodzinski, j., 2015. The Challenges of Art Education in Designer Capitalism: Collaborative Practices in the (New Media) Arts. *ijADE* 34.4, pages 282–295.

Kallio-Tavin, M. 2015. Becoming Culturally Diversified. In Kallio-Tavin, M. and Pullinen, J. (ed.) 2015. *Conversations on Finnish Art Education*. Helsinki, Aalto ARTS Books, pages 20–32.

Lewis, T., E. 2014 (first published in 2012). *The Aesthetics of Education. Theatre, Curiosity, and Politics in the work of Jacques Rancière and Paulo Freire*. New York, Bloomsbury Academic.

Lewis, T., E. 2013. Jacques Rancière's Aesthetic Regime and Democratic Education. *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, Vol. 47, No. 2, Summer 2013, pages 49–70.

Lewis, T., E. 2015. "Move Around! There is Something to See Here": The Biopolitics of the Perceptual Pedagogy of the Arts. *Studies in Art Education*, 57 (1), pages 53–62.

McDonnell, J. 2014. Reimagining the Role of Art in the Relationship between Democracy and Education. *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 2014 Vol. 46, No. 1, 46–58.

Pohjakallio, P., 2015. Unnamed introduction to a section. In Pohjakallio, P. and Kallio-Tavin, M. (ed.) 2015. *Kuvis sata: Kuvataideopettäjien koulutus 1915–2015*. Helsinki, Aalto ARTS Books, pages 66–67.

Rancière, J. 1991 (original published in French 1987 as *Maître ignorant*). *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*. Stanford, Stanford University Press.

Rancière, J. 1999 (original published in French in 1995 as *La mésentente: Politique et philosophie*). *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

Rancière, J. 2004 (original published in French in 2000 as *Le partage du sensible: Esthétique et politique*). *The Politics of Aesthetics*. Translated by Rockhill, G. London, Continuum.

Rancière, J. 2009 a (original published in French 2008 as *Le spectateur émancipé*). *The Emancipated Spectator*. (Translated by Gregory Elliott.) London, Verso.

- Rancière, J. 2009 b. A few remarks on the method of Jacques Rancière. *Parallax*, 15:3, pages 114–123.
- Rancière, Jacques 2010 a Ten Theses on Politics. In Corcoran, Steven (ed. and transl.) 2010. *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics*. London, Continuum.
- Rancière, J. 2010 b (Original presented in 2002 in). On Ignorant Schoolmasters. In Bingham, C and Biesta, G. 2010. *Jacques Rancière. Education, Truth, Emancipation*. Pages 1-16. London, Continuum.
- Rancière, J. 2010 c. Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man? In *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics*, pages 62-75. (Edited and translated by Steven Corcoran). London, Continuum
- Rancière, J. 2011. A Politics of Aesthetic Indetermination: An Interview with Frank Ruda & Jan Voelker. Translated by Smith, Jason E.. In Smith, Jason, E. and Weisser, Annette 2011 (ed.). *Everything is in Everything. Jacques Rancière Between Intellectual Emancipation and Aesthetic Education*, pages 10–33. Pasadena, Art Center Graduate Press.
- Tervo, J. 2012. The Problem of Representation. *Studies in Art Education* 54(1), pages 81–83.
- Tervo, J. (2014). *Corrosive Subjectifications: Theorizing Radical Politics of Art Education in the Intersection of Jacques Ranciere and Giorgio Agamben*. (Electronic Thesis or Dissertation). Retrieved from <https://etd.ohiolink.edu/>
- Thumlert, K. 2015. Affordances of Equality: Ranciere, Emerging Media, and the New Amateur. *Studies in Art Education*, 56 (2), pages 114–126.
- Wallin, J. 2012. Bon mots for bad thoughts. *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education*. Vol. 33, No. 1, pages 147–162.